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This article describes how the SEC’s position on hedge clauses has evolved in light of
the IAA’s anti-fraud provisions, culminating in
the 2007 no-action letter of Heitman Capital
Management, LLC,4 which granted new and
unexpected leeway to advisers. In Heitman
Capital, the SEC stated that it would no
longer provide no-action guidance on hedge
clauses; therefore, the only avenue for further
development of the law in this area is in the
courts or SEC enforcement actions.
Although hedge clauses have been raised
by plaintiffs in a number of cases, there has
only been one case with a published opinion
that addresses the effect hedge clauses have
on a contract between an investment adviser
and its advisee. The Ninth Circuit, in the
recent case of Hsu v. UBS Financial Services,
Inc.,5 has allowed an investment adviser to
legally disclaim its liability – or create the
perception in the mind of the advisee that
the adviser has disclaimed its liability – for
the actions of an investment manager to
whom the investment adviser refers an advisee. This is a surprising outcome because
recommending an investment manager can
constitute investment advice under the IAA,6
and the disclaimer of liability for the recommended manager’s actions is arguably
inconsistent with the recommending adviser’s
broad fiduciary duties.7
The SEC has relied upon two IAA provisions in developing its position on hedge
clauses. The first is Section 206, the anti-fraud
provisions, and the second is Section 215,
the provision voiding certain illegal advisory
contracts. Sections 206(1) and 206(2) make it
unlawful for an investment adviser “to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any
client or prospective client,” and/or to “engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client or prospective client,” respectively.8
Section 215(a) provides that “any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person
to waive compliance with any provision of
this subchapter or with any rule, regulation, or
order thereunder shall be void.”9
The SEC’s first statement on hedge clauses
came in a 1951 Opinion of the General
Counsel.10 The hedge clauses addressed
in the general counsel’s opinion related to
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literature used by both broker-dealer and
investment advisers containing recommendations or information on particular securities.
Such publications contained statements to
the effect “that the information furnished is
obtained from sources believed to be reliable
but that no assurance can be given as to its
accuracy,” with occasionally added language
“to the effect that no liability is assumed with
respect to such information.” Concerned that
a hedge clause would “create in the mind of
the investor a belief that he has given up legal
rights and is foreclosed from a remedy which
he might otherwise have either at common
law or under the” federal securities laws, the
general counsel opined that a hedge clause or
similar provision violates Section 206’s antifraud provisions (and other SEC statutes) if it
“is likely to lead an investor to believe that he
has in any way waived any right of action he
may have.”11
Over time, the hedge clause language was
generalized by broker-dealers and investment
advisers to contracts with advisees beyond
the literature context. The added language
disclaiming liability mentioned in the general
counsel’s opinion is what the SEC has focused
on in a series of no-action letters and enforcement actions.
Until 2007, the SEC through a series of
no-action letters and enforcement actions took
a very restrictive position on what a permissible hedge clause was. Essentially, in the
no-action letters described in this article, the
SEC reasoned that the antifraud provisions
of the IAA contained in Sections 206(1) and
206(2) were violated any time a hedge clause
attempted to limit investment adviser liability
for negligence or malfeasance by using such
adjectives as “gross” or “willful” to qualify
what type of investment adviser negligence
or malfeasance might trigger liability to an
advisee. In 2007, the SEC issued a no-action
letter to Heitman Capital Management, LLC,
which marked a turn in the SEC’s position and
declared, for the first time, that such qualifications are not per se violations of Sections
206(1) and 206(2). Rather, the Heitman Capital
no-action letter announced that whether a
particular hedge clause is “mislead[ing] [as to]
any particular Client” can only be answered
by a “fact-intensive…inquiry” that focuses
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adviser’s fiduciary obligations to its clients.”20
This conclusion is consistent with the reasoning behind the SEC’s no-action letters.
In addition to the above-cited no-action
letters, the SEC has instituted three enforcement actions that penalized advisors for
using hedge clauses, among other violations,
although none of these actions provide much
additional guidance on what makes a hedge
clause problematic. In the two earliest actions
from 1979 and 1981, the SEC did not describe
the content of the hedge clause or why it was
objectionable.21 In 1994, the SEC brought
an enforcement action alleging, among other
violations, that the adviser’s agreements contained a paragraph purporting to limit the
adviser’s liability to “gross negligence or willful misconduct,” although the SEC still provided no explanation of why the hedge clause
was problematic.22
There also is a well-developed body of
state administrative law adopting the SEC’s
approach to limitations on hedge clauses
and applying it to state registered investment
advisers.23 In part, this is a function of the
fact that many state securities laws governing
investment advisers are modeled on the IAA24
and in part a function of the fact that the antifraud provisions of Section 206 of the IAA are
not limited to investment advisers registered
with the SEC.
The “hedge clause” doctrine and the 1951
general counsel’s opinion have been cited by
the SEC in other areas of investment adviser
regulation where, in the SEC’s view, an advisee
might be misled into believing that he or she
had no rights arising from the fiduciary duties
owed by an investment adviser to its advisees.
For example, in a 1984 no-action letter Robert
D. Brown Investment Counsel, Inc.,25 the SEC
stated that a provision in a year-to-year advisory contract providing that the advisee could
only elect to terminate the contract once a
year (on the contract’s anniversary) was fraudulent and deceptive under the IAA. The fiduciary relationship between investment adviser
and advisee was built on confidence, the SEC
explained, and, if that confidence was lost, a
provision in the contract requiring the further
rendering of services, even if they were not
satisfactory, raised “serious questions” under
the IAA’s anti-fraud provisions. The SEC

on a particular advisee’s “particular circumstances,” the “relationship and communications between” the investment adviser and
the advisee, and “the form and content of the
hedge clause.”12
It was not until the 1970s that the SEC
first began to give some content to the 1951
opinion of its general counsel. In various noactions letters, the SEC separately rejected
attempts to disclaim investment adviser liability for “ordinary negligence,”13 to limit such
liability to “gross negligence or willful malfeasance,”14 and to limit such liability to “acts
done in bad faith.”15 The SEC has pointed
out that the use of adjectives to qualify liability for negligence or malfeasance may violate
Section 206 because there may be situations
where applicable law requires a greater degree
of care by a fiduciary, and that, accordingly,
the agreement should at the least state that
the advisor was not disclaiming liability for
“violation[s] of applicable law.”16 One way
used by an investment adviser to clarify such
waivers has been to include a statement to the
effect that an advisee has not waived his rights
under the federal securities law or state law.
The SEC has made clear that reference merely
to the federal securities laws is not adequate.17
Even such a non-waiver statement was not
necessarily adequate in the SEC’s view, however. As the SEC understood fiduciary law, an
advisee “may have a right of action under federal and state law even where his adviser has
acted in good faith.”18 The SEC pointed out in
one no-action letter that the combination of a
non-waiver statement with a disclaimer of an
investment adviser’s liability for gross or willful conduct might lead an “unsophisticated”
advisee to believe it had no legal rights for any
actions undertaken by an investment adviser.19
The SEC has never addressed the issue of
whether exculpatory clauses other than those
discussed to this point might be permissible.
But the State of Connecticut has done so
when it stated in a release that exculpatory
provisions relieving an investment adviser of
its “liability for losses caused by conditions
and events beyond its control such as war,
strikes, natural disasters, new government
restrictions, market fluctuations, communications disruptions, etc. … are acceptable since
they do not attempt to limit or misstate the
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stated that a provision denying a client’s right
to terminate the contract was invalid because
“the contract might lead the client to believe
that he is not entitled to terminate the contract
when fiduciary principles indicate that he has
that right.”26
Based on the SEC’s actions, and especially
the no-action letters, one could have read the
agency’s position on hedge clauses to be very
restrictive in setting limits on the contractual rights of an investment adviser and its
advisee to negotiate disclaimers of liability.
But this is not what the SEC’s current position is on hedge clauses, as it made clear in a
seminal 2007 no-action letter, Heitman Capital
Management, LLC.27 Heitman Capital sought
guidance on a hedge clause in which an advisee indemnified Heitman Capital and other
investment advisers affiliated with Heitman
Capital, except for “grossly negligent, reckless, willfully improper or illegal conduct in its
performance;” actions “outside the scope of
[the] Manager’s authority;” or “other material
breach under” the advisory contract. In addition to this hedge clause, the agreement also
contained a “non-waiver of rights” provision:
“Notwithstanding the foregoing,” nothing in
the agreement was to constitute a waiver of
any of the client’s “legal rights under applicable [US] federal securities law or any other
laws whose applicability is not permitted to be
contractually waived.”
In its letter to the SEC, Heitman Capial
asserted that its clients were primarily
institutional investors such as large pension
funds that were “sophisticated persons that
have the resources and experience to understand the investment advisory agreements
with the applicable Heitman Advisor, and the
bargaining power to negotiate, and in some
cases even dictate, the terms of the investment advisory agreements.” In addition, some
Heitman Capital investment advisers provided
advice to wrap account and certain commingled fund entities that were represented by
financial intermediaries with allegedly similar
levels of sophistication and bargaining power.
Heitman Capital also contended that most
of these financial intermediaries had a separate responsibility to negotiate with Heitman
Capital in the best interests of their underlying clients and assist their clients in evaluating
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the advisory agreement, including the hedge
clause and non-waiver disclosure.
The SEC’s Division of Investment
Management’s response noted Heitman
Capital’s representations, and reiterated the
general principle that whether an advisor’s
hedge clause purporting to limit adviser liability to acts of gross negligence or willful
malfeasance violates Section 206 depends on
all of the “surrounding facts and circumstances.” In this analysis, the SEC wrote that
it would consider (1) “the form and content”
of the particular hedge clause, “e.g., its accuracy,” (2) communications between the adviser
and the client about the hedge clause, and
(3) the particular circumstances of the client.
Where a client was “unsophisticated” in the
law, the SEC asserted, relevant factors would
include whether the hedge clause was “written
in plain English,” “individually highlighted
and explained during an in-person meeting,”
and whether “enhanced disclosure” was provided to explain when a client may still have a
right of action.28
In light of these general principles and
Heitman Capital’s factual representations,
the SEC’s response indicated that Heitman
Capital’s use of a hedge clause and non-waiver
disclosure “would not per se violate sections
206(1) and 206(2) of the [IAA].”29 The noaction letter emphasized, however, that the
SEC was taking no position and could give
no assurance on whether this Heitman Capital
advisory agreement was misleading (and therefore illegal) as applied to any particular client
“because of the fact-intensive nature of the
inquiry.”30
In its no-action request, Heitman Capital
relied on an interpretation of state law, including
that of New York, to the effect that agreements
relieving a party of liability for its negligence
will be enforced. Although the SEC made no
mention of this interpretation in its response,
this type of reasoning is implicit in the SEC’s
statement that a hedge clause and non-waiver
disclosure of the type used by the Heitman
Capital investment advisers are not per se violations of the IAA. In other words, in the SEC’s
view, such limitations of liability are apparently permitted if the normal standards for
modifying fiduciary duties, full disclosure and
informed consent by the beneficiary,31 are met.
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As the SEC indicated in Heitman Capital
that it would not be issuing further no-action
or interpretive assurances under Sections
206(1) or 206(2) of the IAA regarding an
adviser’s use of any particular hedge clause,
the only places in which further developments
can occur are SEC enforcement actions or
court cases brought either by the SEC or advisees themselves. Since Heitman Capital, there
have been no SEC enforcement actions on the
subject. One published case briefly mentions
a hedge clause issue but was decided on other
grounds,32 and there are a handful of cases in
which the issue has been raised in the pleadings but that have not resulted in any sort of
decisions or orders in which the issue has been
discussed.33 There has been, however, one
published case substantively treating hedge
clauses: Hsu v. UBS Financial Services, Inc.34
In Hsu, the Ninth Circuit ultimately
affirmed the district court determination that
the plaintiff failed to state a claim under IAA
when he contended that UBS had used an
illegal hedge clause in its contracts with him
and other clients.35 The Hsu decisions reflect a
failure by the plaintiff to clearly connect UBS’
fiduciary obligations as an investment adviser,
which it became by recommending a list of
investment managers to its advisees, to its
disclaimer of liability for the actions of these
investment managers it recommends.
The plaintiff in Hsu was an individual
investor advisee who was seeking class certification for similarly situated advisees. He
had entered into a contract to participate in
UBS’ “wrap” fee program, which consisted of
investment advisory, execution, clearing and
custodial services for a single fee. Under the
arrangement, the plaintiff was provided the
opportunity to select an investment manager
for his wrap fee arrangement, and given a
list of potential investment managers for this
purpose by UBS. Interestingly, while the wrap
fee provisions and list that UBS provided to
the plaintiff purported to be only a recommended list of permissible advisers – that is,
the advisee was free to select an investment
manager other than from the UBS list – the
plaintiff attached to his complaint what allegedly were UBS’ internal guidelines indicating
that the advisee must select someone from the
UBS pre-approved list.36 The plaintiff selected

Horizon Asset Management Services, LLC
(Horizon) as its investment manager from the
list that UBS provided. The basis for the plaintiff’s complaint was UBS’ apparent disclaimer
of liability for the third-party investment manager Horizon’s actions.
The plaintiff sought rescission of the wrap
fee contracts and “restitution [from UBS]
for sums paid to defendant by all class members.” To show that UBS unlawfully limited its
liability, plaintiff’s main argument was based
on a comparison of the language describing
the wrap fee program and UBS’ obligations
to advisees in different provisions of the subject contract and a brochure describing the
program. On the one hand, plaintiff noted,
the wrap fee account disclosure stated that
UBS was plaintiff’s “investment advisor” with
a “fiduciary relationship” to plaintiff, and
subject to the legal standards of the IAA.
On the other hand, plaintiff pointed out, the
contract contained a hedge clause with respect
to the third-party investment manager: UBS,
the contract stated, “may or may not have
researched” the investment manager plaintiff
selected.37 In addition, the contract stated
that UBS “shall not be liable for and Client
agrees to hold UBS Financial Services Inc.
harmless against all losses to Client for any
error of judgment, mistake of law, negligence,
willful misfeasance, or bad faith on the part of
the Investment Manager or any other matter
within the Investment Manager’s control such
as … compliance with applicable law.”
The district court granted UBS’ motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim, agreeing with UBS that it did not disclaim any
duties owed to the plaintiff and that it had
not required the plaintiff to waive any rights
under the IAA.38 Essentially, the district court
observed, the plaintiff’s argument was that,
while the UBS statement that it was a fiduciary and the hedge clause disclaiming liability
for conduct by Horizon, Hsu’s investment
manager, may have been clear when read in
isolation, those two provisions were contradictory and misleading when read together.
But the hedge clause was not “incongruous”
with the other terms of the contract, the
district court held, and, therefore, was not
deceptive. The district court explained: “The
contract never disclaimed liability for UBS’s
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own role as investment advisor [sic]. Rather,
it disclaimed liability for any misconduct on
behalf of Horizon, HSU’s separate investment
manager.”39
In ruling that UBS was permitted to disclaim liability for Horizon’s misconduct
under these circumstances, the district court’s
ruling was seemingly vulnerable to appeal.
Recommendations regarding whether to select
a particular investment adviser can qualify
one as an investment adviser under the IAA.
If a fiduciary recommends a particular investment adviser who should not have been recommended, then there could be a violation
of the recommender’s fiduciary duties, and
specifically the recommending fiduciary’s duty
of care. As an agent, the fiduciary “has a duty
to the principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by
agents in similar circumstances,” and, in evaluating whether that standard has been met,
“[s]pecial skills or knowledge possessed by
[the] agent” are to be taken into account.40 On
the one hand, while fiduciaries are generally
not deemed “insurers” of a particular result
or the acts of others,41 the duty of care can
impose liability for the acts of others, provided
the injurious act of the third-party was foreseeable and the imposition of liability is fair
under the circumstances.42 In the investment
advisory context, it can be argued that the
damaging actions of another adviser that the
principal adviser recommends is foreseeable,
because the principal adviser’s professional
responsibilities necessarily relate to the advisory services the third-party is to provide to
the client, and the disclaimer of liability by an
investment adviser for the actions of another
investment manager whom the adviser recommends seems potentially inconsistent with
the investment adviser’s fiduciary obligations.
Additionally, applying the Heitman Capital
principles to Hsu, if UBS had a fiduciary duty
of care with respect to its selection of recommended investment managers, then it seems
likely that an advisee could be confused by the
various exculpatory statements into thinking
that he or she had no cause of action against
UBS for its choosing to include specified
investment managers in its recommended list.
At the motion to dismiss stage, the plaintiff
did not expressly argue, and the district court
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did not render a ruling, on whether UBS owed
a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff in connection
with the list of investment managers UBS
provided. Rather, the district court held that
there was “no contradiction” between the
statements that UBS owed a fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff and the exculpatory provisions.43
Implicit in the district court’s conclusion that
there is no contradiction between the provisions is that UBS and the plaintiff had the
contractual power to limit UBS’ fiduciary
duties to the plaintiff, something which UBS
had done, as it appears that it took almost
no responsibility for its list of recommended
investment managers.
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff in contrast did clearly argue that “the
recommendation of an investment manager
to a client generally qualifies as an advisory
service and is subject to” the IAA.44 UBS
countered that Hsu “erroneously assumes”
that UBS engages in investment advisory services “merely by providing a list of Investment
Managers” to clients, and that, “irrespective
of whether UBS’ mere provision of a list of
Investment Managers constituted an advisory service,” UBS’ disclaimer of liability for
Horizon’s conduct did not contradict the other
contract provisions of UBS fiduciary duties.45
It was UBS’ argument that ultimately prevailed, as the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint. In a brief four
paragraph decision, not selected for publication, the court ruled that the plaintiff failed
to satisfy Rule 9’s pleading requirement of
setting forth what is false or misleading about
a statement, and why it is misleading, and,
therefore, failed to put UBS on fair notice of
the claim. According to the Ninth Circuit,
while the plaintiff asserted that UBS deceived
clients by leading them to believe that they
waived certain “unwaivable fiduciary duties”
through the hedge clauses, the plaintiff never
“identifies or explains what those ‘unwaivable fiduciary duties are’ … HSU’s claim fails
because the clauses that he points to do
not waive compliance with any provision of
the IAA.”46 Judging by the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, it appears that, despite there being
references by the plaintiff to UBS’ owing a
fiduciary duty to plaintiff based on its list of
recommended investment managers in both
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plaintiff’s opening and reply briefs to the
Ninth Circuit, the point was lost on the panel.
The Ninth Circuit also refused to consider
plaintiff’s argument that, in practice, UBS
allegedly required clients to use an investment
manager from the UBS pre-approved list, calling this an argument raised for the first time on
appeal.47 This is puzzling, however, because the
plaintiff had cited an internal UBS document
that ostensibly required that the investment
manager be on UBS’ pre-approved list, both
in his complaint and his opposition to UBS’
motion to dismiss. While it can be argued from
the pleadings and opposition to motion to dismiss that UBS’ policy requiring the plaintiff to
select an adviser from the list was not a central
focal point of the plaintiff’s contention that
UBS violated the anti-fraud provision (that was
the language of the hedge clauses themselves),
the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to consider the argument works a particularly harsh result, given
that the plaintiff referenced the point below,
and its close relation to the hedge clauses and
fiduciary duty issues raised in the complaint.
On paper, the Hsu plaintiff’s case seemed
solid under the principles elucidated in
Heitman Capital: the plaintiff was not an
institutional investor, and there were no facts
suggesting that he was a sophisticated person,
had any bargaining power to negotiate with
UBS over the hedge clause, or that the hedge
clause was ever explained to him by UBS
or any intermediary. But the Hsu opinions
reflect the practical difficulty that plaintiffs
may have in stating claims under the IAA for
deceptive practices based on hedge clauses.
In the section of its decision summarizing the
parties’ respective arguments, the district court
noted, in a manner suggesting skepticism, that
the plaintiff was seeking rescission of “‘ all’ of
UBS’ contracts for this particular ‘wrap’ fee
program” (emphasis in original). Although
the district court never gave a ground for its
skepticism, perhaps it grew out of several facts,
including some of which UBS pointed out in
its motion to dismiss or on appeal: plaintiff
utilized Horizon as his investment manager
for approximately two-and-one half years in
the program, never exercising his apparent
right to switch his investment manager at any
time;48 and plaintiff never alleged that he was
“ever actually misled” by the hedge clause or

anything else into believing that he was actually
unable to sue UBS for Horizon’s conduct.49
Heitman Capital clarified that disclaimers
for a variety of conduct such as mere negligence
are potentially permissible if the advisee is sufficiently sophisticated and possesses bargaining
power or is represented by a financial intermediary with these qualities. Without regard to
whom the advisee or the financial intermediary
is, Hsu allowed a hedge clause disclaiming an
adviser’s liability for the acts of an investment
manager that the investment adviser recommends, even though that recommendation in
itself constitutes investment advice.
Further developments in this area will have
to await further litigation or SEC enforcement
actions. But, as the courts have proven to be
inhospitable venues for complaints about hedge
clauses, we may be waiting for quite some time.
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